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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Resource mobilization, a dominant theoretical approach to the study of social movements for 
many decades, points to social movement organizations (SMOs) as a focal point for efforts to 
understand the variations in both the impact and fate of social movements. SMOs, like other types of 
political organizations, are expected to represent members’ common preferences for some specified 
social change, acting to bring about such change through influence on formal political decision-making, 
or on general behaviors of the members of a polity, or on both. In this context, the classic analysis offered 
by Robert Michels ([1911] 1962) of typical evolutionary processes in the governance of political 
organizations, and the impact of such processes on organizations’ goals, is very relevant to scholars of 
social movements. Early studies of social movements often drew heavily on Michels’ work, documenting 
and fleshing out the nature of the evolutionary processes he posited, and the transformational 
consequences for social movements. Concern with movement transformation has been less dominant in 
contemporary work, despite a lack of evidence that such processes are any less operative in current 
movement organizations. Below, the key processes involved in what Michels’ referred to as the “iron law 
of oligarchy” are sketched, followed by a brief discussion of some of the implications of this analysis for 
social movement researchers. 
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Resource mobilization, a dominant theoretical approach to the study of social movements for 
many decades, points to social movement organizations (SMOs) as a focal point for efforts to understand 
the variations in both the impact and fate of social movements. SMOs, like other types of political 
organizations, are expected to repr esent members’ common preferences for some specified social change, 
acting to bring about such change through influence on formal political decision-making, or on general 
behaviors of the members of a polity, or on both. In this context, the classic analysis offered by Robert 
Michels ([1911] 1962) of typical evolutionary processes in the governance of political organizations, and 
the impact of such processes on organizations’ goals, is very relevant to scholars of social movements. 
Early studies of social movements often drew heavily on Michels’ work (e.g., Messinger, 1955; Sills, 
1957; Zald and Denton, 1963), documenting and fleshing out the nature of the evolutionary processes he 
posited, and the transformational consequences for social movements. Concern with movement 
transformation has been less dominant in contemporary work, despite a lack of evidence that such 
processes are any less operative in current movement organizations. Below, the key processes involved 
in what Michels’ referred to as the “iron law of oligarchy” are sketched, followed by a brief discussion of 
some of the implications of this analysis for social movement researchers. 
Drawing on his own disillusioning experiences as a member and supporter of a socially 
liberal political party in early 20th century Germany, Michels described a number of conditions 
and processes that inevitably impelled (in his view) even the most democratically-committed 
organizations to become divided into a set of elites, or oligarchs, with their own set of distinctive 
interests in the organization, and the rest of the membership, whose labor and resources are 
exploited by the elites. The first condition precipitating the drift to such an oligarchical system is, 
ironically, success in recruiting new members to the organization’s cause. As organizations 
grow, the ability of members to participate equally in organizational decisions becomes 
progressively more difficult, both because it is hard to find a place and time for all members to 
assemble and because decision-making is significantly slowed – not infrequently to a standstill – 
as the number of decision-makers increases. The usual response is to such problems is 
de legation of responsibility to a relatively small subset of members for formulating and 
recommending lines of action. Although members may attempt to maintain democratic control 
by demanding extensive explanations for leaders’ proposals and maintaining ultimate voting 
rights on these, a number of forces militate against such control. 
First, as a very large body of research on organizations has documented, increases in 
organizational size lead to increases in complexity – the creation of separate, specialized 
positions and units to carry out different tasks – as well as to increases in rules and formal 
processes. Thus, effective administration requires both hard-to-gain, specialized knowledge of 
these aspects of the organization (Michels referred to this as “administrative secrets”), and what 
are often scarce organizing talents, such as the ability to manage interpersonal relations and to 
conduct logistical planni ng. This limits the ability of rank-and-file members to challenge 
leaders’ recommendations or decisions, and to replace them; thus, power increasingly inheres in 
the leadership. 
Moreover, once ensconced, leaders are likely to acquire vested interests in maintaining 
their po sitions in the organization. As with complexity and formalization, increasing 
organizational size also typically leads to the creation of full-time administrative positions; thus, 
office-holding becomes a means through which incumbents make their livelihood. Michels 
argued that this, in turn, makes it likely that the leaders will ultimately recognize their common 
interests in maintaining their positions within the organization, and develop a sense of solidarity 
with one another (becoming, in Marxian terminology, like a classe fur sich). As such, they are 
inclined to act cohesively in fending off criticisms and warding off displacement efforts by the 
membership. If serious challenges are not readily suppressed, the leaders may resort to 
cooptation of individual rank-and-file members, thus effectively hobbling lower-level resistance. 
Because their continued position also depends on the survival of the organizations, Michels also 
suggested that leaders of once-radical protest organizations are likely to guide them in an 
increasingly conservative direction, to minimize chances of state or general social sanctioning, 
and the ultimate disbanding of the organization. Given these commonplace evolut ionary 
developments in organizations, Michel was led to the famous, pessimistic conclusion ([1911] 
1962: 365), “He who says organization, says oligarchy.” 
As noted at the outset, Michels’ analysis has provided the basis for a number of classic 
studies documenting the evolution and transformation of social movements; it has also generated 
efforts to define conditions that may mitigate the postulated evolutionary processes (see Lipset, 
Trow and Coleman, 1956; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). (For an extended discussion of Michels’ 
arguments and the implications for studies of hierarchical economic organizations, see Tolbert 
and Hiatt, 2009). It has been revisited, although somewhat less directly, in research and debates 
on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of professional employees by social movement 
organizations (e.g., Jenkins, 1977; McAdam, 1983; Staggenborg, 1988). A key implication of 
Michels’ work for social movement researchers, however, has been given only limited attention: 
the need to understand sources of variations in governance arrangements, and their impact on 
SMO decision-making processes and outcomes. Some progress has begun to be made on this 
front (e.g., Carmin and Balser, 2002; Jasper, 2004; Osterman, 2006), and recent studies have 
explicitly called for more work (Minkoff and McCarthy, 2005), but it remains an important, 
largely unexplored legacy of Michels. 
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